Violations of the absolute priority rule (APR) are commonplace in private workouts, formal business reorganizations, and personal bankruptcies. While some theorists suggest they may arise endogenously, they are clearly magnified by the institutional structure of the bankruptcy code. This paper shows that APR violations exacerbate credit rationing problems by reducing the payment lenders receive in default states. Furthermore, APR violations make default more likely to occur, thereby making debt financing more costly. Together, these results support the view that APR violations create an impediment to efficient financial contracting.
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Introduction
The absolute priority rule (APR) is the theoretical standard by which financial contracts are resolved when a debtor is insolvent. Simply stated, this rule requires that the debtor receive no value from his assets until all of his creditors have been repaid in full. While this rule would seem quite 1 simple to implement, it is routinely circumvented in practice.
Violations of the APR in Chapter 11 reorganizations are well documented. Studies by Betker (1995) , Franks and Torous (1991) , and LoPucki and Whitford (1990) have shown that stockholders of publicly traded companies that go through reorganizations receive value about 75 percent of the time, even though their creditors are not paid the full value of their claims. The magnitude of these deviations is not small. Eberhart, Moore, and Roenfeldt (1990) find that the firm's original equity holders retain 7.6 percent of the firm's value on average.
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These violations may be even larger in small business bankruptcies. LoPucki and Whitford (1990) argue that for small businesses with a single owner/manager, "equity frequently dominates the bargain to such an extent that the absolute priority rule is virtually stood on its head." Because 4 11 U.S.C. §522.
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See Roe (1983) , Bebchuk (1988) , and Aghion, et al. (1992) . In addressing this question, I point out two additional problems associated with APR violations. First, they make default more likely, increasing the interest rate borrowers must pay when raising funds. Second, APR violations make credit rationing problems more severe, since they make lenders less willing to offer loans to borrowers. My results thus support the view that APR violations impede efficient financial contracting.
See also Jaffee and Russell (1976), Smith, (1983) , Thakor (1987a, 1987b) , Smith and 7 Stutzer (1989), Gale (1990), and Ferguson and Peters (1996) .
Also see Boyd and Smith (1993a). 8 In this respect, my results are similar to those of Calomiris and Hubbard (1990) , who argue that 9 external finance will be differentially available to firms based on their ability to raise internal finance.
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The traditional model of credit rationing was developed by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and focused on borrowers' adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Williamson (1986 Williamson ( , 1987 showed that credit rationing could exist even without these problems, relying instead on the costly state verification (CSV) framework used in this article. Each of these credit rationing models 8 focuses on a market made up of many borrowers, and rationed agents are denied loans even though they are willing to offer a higher rate of interest than that paid by those who do receive credit.
Since I use a CSV environment, my model most closely resembles that of Williamson (1987) .
Credit rationing occurs in Williamson's model because lenders have different reservation returns, giving rise to an upward sloping supply function for loans. In my model, however, lenders all have the same reservation return, differing instead in their access to internal funds. As a result, costly state verification and APR violations limit the amount of financing any investor is willing to provide a firm. Hence, firms with little access to internal funds are rationed out of the market while those who require smaller loans are able to finance their projects.
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An alternative interpretation of credit rationing in my model is that it limits the size of project the borrower is able to undertake. One advantage to this approach is that it shows the essential similarity between a borrower who is credit rationed and one who is "credit constrained. See also the later extensions by Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) .
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See also Innes (1990) . Bulow and Shoven (1978) and White (1980 White ( , 1983 were among the first to question the efficiency of strict adherence to the APR. They show that when a firm is in financial distress, the 10 APR generally leads to inefficient investment and liquidation/continuation decisions. In particular, the APR leads to an underinvestment problem, because they assume that equityholders can renegotiate their bank debt but not their public bonds. Since the benefits of some positive net present value projects will accrue only to bondholders, the firm has no incentive to undertake them. Berkovitch and Israel (1991) examine these over and underinvestment problems in more detail and
Other Views on the APR
show that APR violations allow the firm to efficiently renegotiate its debt, thereby eliminating perverse ex post investment incentives.
APR violations can also have a significant effect on ex ante moral hazard problems. Eberhart and Senbet (1993) argue that APR violations reduce the risk-shifting incentives that arise as the firm approaches financial distress. Since shareholders receive a portion of the firm's revenues even in default, they have less incentive to take risky actions that might reduce this value. In contrast, Bebchuk (1991) and Longhofer and Carlstrom (1995) conclude that this moral hazard problem is worsened by APR violations, since they reduce the pain of bankruptcy for the entrepreneur.
11
Although these papers come to opposite conclusions, their results are entirely compatible, given their differing assumptions about when the firm can affect its return distribution. Generally, risk-shifting has two opposing effects on the firm's value. First, the firm's return in nonbankruptcy states is higher, raising expected profit. Second, the probability of bankruptcy is increased, reducing 6 expected profit. Immediately after contracting, when Bebchuk and Longhofer and Carlstrom assume risk shifting occurs, the latter effect generally dominates, since lenders will insist on being compensated for this possibility. In contrast, Eberhart and Senbet assume that risk shifting takes place only after new information about the firm's prospects is revealed. At this time, the first effect may overwhelm the second: If the firm's prospects are sufficiently bad and bankruptcy is likely to occur regardless of the action taken by the firm, increasing this probability provides little deterrence.
APR violations have been examined in other contexts as well. Harris and Raviv (1993) contend that court-imposed APR violations can be an important part of state-dependent financial contracts, which are desirable whenever the firm's assets are difficult to verify but more valuable in the hands of the entrepreneur. Bebchuk and Picker (1993) propose that APR violations reduce the incentive of an owner/manager to select inefficient "insider" projects whose values are highly dependent on the manager's personal skills, and also encourage the owner/manager to invest in his own human capital. Both of these papers provide reasons APR violations may be desirable. On the other hand, Eberhart and Sweeney (1996) find that between 30 and 85 percent of the noise in the market for bankrupt firms' bonds may be attributable to APR violations, and thus conclude that APR violations are detrimental because they add uncertainty to the security valuation process.
In what follows, I show that APR violations make credit rationing more likely. The more the debtor receives in default states, the lower the threshold at which increases in the interest rate reduce the lender's expected return. Furthermore, I demonstrate that APR violations reduce social welfare by making default, which is costly, more likely to occur. Together, my results support the view that APR violations are undesirable.
A Model with Debt and APR Violations
Consider a two-period world with a large number of risk-neutral economic actors. We may think of these actors as individual consumers or, alternatively, as firms. In the first case, I assume that individuals have some random income in period two, but wish to consume a good that costs K in the first period; this good might be education, a house, a car, or some other consumer good. In the second case, we can think of firms as having some project in which they can invest K in the first period to obtain a random return in period two. In either case, agents die at the end of period two, and the good/investment chosen in period one has no residual value. In what follows, I will use the "firm" terminology, but it should be clear that either interpretation would work equally well.
Each firm is identical except for its private access to internal funds; to distinguish among firms, I will index them by i. Denote firm i's internal resources as W < K. Since firms' initial i endowments are insufficient to finance the project, they must raise funds from outside investors. Let Although firms differ in their access to internal funds, their project returns are all independent and identically distributed. Thus, there is no loss of generality in restricting attention to the problem of an individual firm and its investor. Let x denote the project's return in period two, F(x) the distribution function for x, and f(x) its density function, which is strictly positive on its support
. Although the firm can costlessly observe the realized x, the investor can only do so by incurring state verification costs of c. Thus, I adopt the CSV environment of Townsend (1979) and Franks and Torous (1994) and White (1992) provide evidence suggesting that the percentage of 12 the firm's assets given to equity is larger the closer the firm is to solvency, i.e., that is an increasing function of x. This would imply , a more restrictive assumption than is necessary for my results; the assumption > 0 ensures that my results are true for an even wider range of functional forms
This assumption is crucial to the optimality of debt in my model. Alternatively, I could assume 13 that APR violations arise only in "bankruptcy" and, as such, are a consequence only of contracts labeled as "debt"; I discuss this possibility in Section 5.
8 Gale and Hellwig (1985) . Let R(x) denote the (state-contingent) payment made by the firm to the investor.
To focus on the impact of APR violations, let (x,) denote the minimum value the firm receives in verification states as a function of x; in other words, (x,) is an exogenous constraint on R(x), with being a shift parameter. Such a specification facilitates comparative statics on .
For example, an increase in shows the impact of changes in the magnitude of the APR violation.
Hereafter, I assume > 0, meaning that an increase in the shift parameter leads to a weak increase in (x) for all x, with a strictly positive change for some x.
Obviously, (x,) x for all x and . I also assume that (0,1) for all x and , consistent x with two stylized facts. First, the size of the APR violation is increasing in the level of the firm's assets. Second, as the firm has an additional dollar to distribute in verification states, some of it 12 will be given to the investor. Finally, to make the problem interesting (i.e., to have some risk involved), assume , and, to avoid unlimited liability problems for the investor, assume . This definition of assumes that APR violations are unavoidable when verification occurs.
Hence, the state contingent payment R(x) represents the actual amount received by the investor, net of the APR "transfer" in verification states. Thus, the incorporation of APR violations into the
13
This new constraint is a feasibility constraint: R(x) x -(x,) for all x in the verification region.
14 Strictly speaking, I have assumed that state verification is perfect and that it occurs in a 15 deterministic manner. If stochastic verification is allowed, the simple debt contract will not, in general, be optimal (see Townsend, 1979; Mookherjee and Png, 1989; and Border and Sobel, 1987) . It is worth noting, however, that Boyd and Smith (1994) show that the gains from stochastic monitoring are likely to be small.
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CSV environment adds a new, exogenous constraint not considered by Townsend (1979) The verification region is a lower interval.
In other words, the optimal financial contract is a (modified) simple debt contract.
In this model, I have assumed APR violations happen whenever state verification occurs.
This places an additional constraint on the contracting problem, limiting the size of the transfer to the investor in verification states. As I will show below, this added constraint has important implications for the efficiency of debt. Nevertheless, it does not alter the fact that debt is the optimal contract.
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Let R denote the gross payment (principal and interest) due the investor (henceforth called the lender) in period 2; for ease of exposition, I will often refer to R as "the interest rate." Let x represent the critical value of x below which the firm (borrower) defaults; since the lender will
L(R,I,(x,))
P x x [x c (x,)] dF(x) P xx R dF(x) I .
L(R ,I,(x,)) 0 ,
Such an x must exist if lending is to take place.
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Some of the specific calculations that follow, however, differ when .
default whenever the payment he must make by doing so is less than R, x is defined by the equation
It is worth noting that this definition of x assumes the firm will default opportunistically.
That is, the firm will default in some states even though it has sufficient revenue to pay its debt in full. The intuition here is straightforward. If x = R + J < x , APR violations cause the firm to earn more by defaulting than it does by repaying its debt (i.e., (R+J,) > J). Of course, one could imagine a world in which bankruptcy judges allow no APR violations when x R, in which case x = R, and firms would no longer default opportunistically. Of course, when a lending equilibrium exists, the APR violations that occur in default will be anticipated, forcing the borrower to pay a higher interest rate ex ante. One might suspect that the borrower's expected return in bankruptcy states would exactly cancel his added expected interest costs. In the appendix, however, I show that this is not the case (that is, dB(R ,(x,))/d < 0).
*
This fact is an immediate consequence of the optimality of simple debt, and its intuition is straightforward. Violations of the APR reduce the lender's expected return in default states. As 18 a result, the lender must receive a larger payment in nondefault states, i.e., the face value of the debt must be larger to maintain the zero-profit constraint. This means that default will occur more often, implying its deadweight costs will be incurred more often as well. It is worth noting that if c, the deadweight cost of state verification, were zero, the size of (x,) would have no impact on the borrower's expected return. But, of course, if this were the case, simple debt would no longer necessarily be the optimal financial contract.
Because ex post state verification is costly in my model, Proposition 1 assures us that debt is, in fact, the best way for the investor to advance funds to the firm. As a consequence, when lending occurs in equilibrium, the existence of APR violations, while beneficial ex post for a borrower in default, actually reduces the borrower's ex ante expected return. The next logical question, then, is: How do APR violations affect the lender's willingness to make loans in equilibrium? In particular, do they change the likelihood of credit rationing? It is this question to which I turn in the next section.
APR Violations and Credit Rationing
Analyze this issue requires first defining what is meant by "credit rationing." Simply stated, credit rationing occurs whenever excess demand for credit persists in equilibrium. Since the market is in equilibrium, by definition there is no pressure for the interest rate to increase to clear the market, as is the case in the classical Walrasian model. In my model, credit rationing means that some firms are unable to finance their investment projects because the interest rate cannot rise enough to ensure that a lender's zero profit constraint (3) is satisfied.
Why does this credit rationing occur? Both the deadweight cost of state verification and the APR violation reduce lenders' expected return in default states. Eventually, increases in the interest rate make default so likely that these costs outweigh the higher return lenders expect to receive in where x here is defined with R = .
Credit rationing occurs in this model because lenders are unwilling to provide financing greater than ; firms that need larger loans (because they have insufficient internal funds) will be unable to finance their projects, despite the fact that they would be willing to pay a higher interest rate if it were offered to them. In other words, letting , firms with are able to finance their projects while those with smaller W cannot.
In the appendix, I argue that is typically negative. For some peculiar functional forms for 21 , however, it is possible that increases with ; in either case, my results still hold.
(6)
I now derive the primary result of the paper:
PROPOSITION 3: Larger APR violations increase the magnitude of credit rationing by reducing the maximum investment that will allow lenders to earn non-negative expected profits; i.e., Figure 1 illustrates the effects summarized in Proposition 3. Holding I constant, an increase in shifts L down and to the left. As a result, loans that will be made when the APR violation is 21
will not be made when the APR violation is increased to -the resulting decrease in the lender's expected return makes loans of I infeasible. The largest loan a lender is willing to make 1 is, instead, I < I . Thus, we see that a larger fraction of firms are rationed when APR violations are greater.
Although firms with limited access to internal funds would be willing to pay a higher interest rate to obtain a loan, and despite the fact that their projects have a positive net present value, large APR violations make lenders unwilling to provide funding to these borrowers at any rate of interest.
Interpreting APR Violations in CSV Models
The model above assumed that APR violations were the inevitable consequence of state verification. That is, regardless of the label affixed to the optimal contract, APR violations limited
In this contract, state verification occurs only when the option is not exercised. Of course, it is well understood that the optimality of debt in CSV models without APR violations arises solely because this contract provides for the right state-contingent payoffs, and other contractual forms are optimal as well. For example, a contract in which the investor receives all the stock of the firm but the entrepreneur receives a call option on this stock with a strike price of R provides exactly the same payoffs as a simple debt contract with face value R, and is thus also an optimal contract.
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Under my assumption that APR violations always arise in verification states, these two contracts remain isomorphic. If I were to assume, however, that APR violations occurred only in contracts labeled as "debt," an important wedge would be driven between levered equity and a call option on the firm's total assets, and the equity/call option contract just described might "dominate" a simple debt contract, despite the fact that the two contracts are theoretically equivalent. In other words, although these two contracts provide the same state-contingent payoffs, if the courts don't take this functional equivalence seriously, an equity/call option contract could avoid the undesirable APR violations that occur in bankruptcy. If this were the case, one would need to explain why debt contracts would be used when APR violations are present.
One answer is that firms typically have multiple creditors, and it would be difficult to coordinate a sequence of options that could account for the needs of all the firm's investors. Second, it is likely that if firms and their creditors were to change the name of their contracts without changing any of their relevant terms, courts would still consider them to be debt contracts and
See, for example, Franks and Torous (1992) , Packer (1996) , and White (1993) . 23 16 subject them to the bankruptcy process. In this case, the two contracts would again be essentially identical, and simple debt would remain the optimal contract.
If I were to interpret APR violations as a consequence of bankruptcy, I would be assuming that different contracts with identical state contingent payoffs have different implementation costs, effectively predetermining the optimal contract. Although I have argued that debt may still be desirable in this environment, its optimality would arise out of characteristics exogenous to the state verification at the heart of the CSV model. All told, I believe that the assumption that APR violations arise whenever state verification occurs is more consistent with the spirit of CSV models in which the form of the optimal financial contract is derived rather than assumed.
Empirical and Policy Implications of the Model
Recently, researchers have focused increased attention on the differences in bankruptcy laws across countries. One important characteristic of bankruptcy institutions that varies dramatically 23 is the relative bargaining power given to debtors. This fact may provide a means of empirically testing the predictions of this paper. Since an important source of APR violations in bankruptcy is the ability of debtors to extract surplus in the renegotiation process, my results suggest that, ceteris paribus, businesses in countries with strong, "pro-debtor" bankruptcy laws will have less access to credit and the cost of that credit will be higher.
My results are also germane to concerns about the cost and availability of consumer credit.
As noted before, individual debtors may violate the APR unilaterally by "exempting" some of their assets from the property of the estate. Although the Code allows states to opt out of this provision, See Bebchuk and Chang (1992) and Brown (1989) for theoretical models suggesting that the 26 structure of Chapter 11 does, in fact, encourage APR violations.
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proposals for possible amendments to the Code. Many had hoped that this Commission's proposals would serve to reduce the strong "pro-debtor" stance in the current code, making it harder for bankrupts to extract value from their creditors. Instead, most of the proposals adopted by the Commission would make the U.S. bankruptcy code even more favorable to bankrupt individuals and businesses than it currently is. In other words, it is likely that these revisions would worsen the 25 APR violations that occur in both personal and business bankruptcies. Accordingly, my results suggest that, if adopted, these proposals would exacerbate credit rationing problems and make credit more costly when it is available.
Conclusion
I have demonstrated that APR violations can exacerbate credit rationing problems. By lowering the lender's expected return, deviations from the APR make fewer loans profitable for lenders. To the extent that existing bankruptcy law makes APR violations more likely, my results imply that it makes credit rationing problems more severe. Even when lending does take place, 26 however, the fact that APR violations make default occur more often reduces the borrower's ex ante expected profit. Both of these effects suggest that APR violations are to be avoided.
These results may be particularly relevant with respect to small business financing. Small businesses are typically more likely to default on their loans than large corporations. In addition,
